Abstract-Wireless sensor networks are specific adhoc networks. They are characterized by their limited computing power and energy constraints. This paper proposes a study of security in this kind of network. We show what are the specificities and vulnerabilities of wireless sensor networks. We present a list of attacks, which can be found in these particular networks, and how they use their vulnerabilities. Finally we discuss about different solutions made by the scientific community to secure wireless sensor networks.
I. Introduction
The facilities of sensors deployment and the cost reductions have increased use of wireless sensor networks. Today we find this kind of network in industrial monitoring, environmental data record [1] [2], home automation [3] , fire detection [4] , medical [5] or even in military applications. Most of these applications are deployed to monitor an area and to have a reaction when they record a critical factor. Data doesn't need to be confidential in areas such as home automation or the capture of environmental events. But confidentiality of data can be essential in other applications, such as for medical diagnostic of a patient in an hospital or for the security of a territory in military. An example of these critical applications can be found in the CodeBlue project [5] or the InterRegIV project SERVASTIC, where sensors collect information from a patient in a hospital. Other examples also exist in military applications such as monitoring a war area, registration of health status or troop's position. In both examples, the confidentiality of the information is essential, from a legal point of view in the first case, and a security point of view in the second. This security is obviously endangered by the medium used, radio waves, but also by specific vulnerabilities of wireless sensor networks.
The solutions used in conventional ad hoc networks, can not be applied in wireless sensor networks, because the sensors are limited by their battery and computing power. Specifically, cryptographic solutions currently used such as public key cryptography are not adapted to be calculated by unpowerful processors of current sensors. In addition, all security protocols have to limit the number of messages needed for its proper functioning, because communication between sensors is the main source of energy consumption in wireless sensor networks.
These constraints [6] require us to rethink effective current solutions in terms of speed of calculation and energy consumption, in order to secure wireless sensor networks without consuming their energies.
In this paper we present specificities of wireless sensor networks and a list of their vulnerabilities. Then we discuss about the most common solutions proposed by the scientific community, what they provide and their limits. This paper is organized as follows : section 2, we describe specificities of wireless sensor networks, focusing on their vulnerabilities and their architecture. In section 3, we list the attacks that threaten wireless sensor networks. In section 4, we present existing solutions to counter these attacks and mechanisms which are used. Finally in Section 5, we conclude on future advances.
II. Architecture of wireless sensor networks
Wireless sensor networks are specific ad-hoc networks [7] with a larger number of nodes, a limited energy and a lower computing power. We are going to introduce these particularities in this part.
A. Topology Figure 1 shows the topology which prevails in wireless sensor networks: a set of nodes ( each node is a sensor), which are raised on an heterogeneous area, on objects or moving individuals. All these nodes communicate with each other. Each node can communicate with other nodes which are located in its coverage area. Generally, wireless sensor networks are connected to one or several base stations named sinks. These base stations or sinks have mission to collect information circulating on the network, and store them or send them directly via an Internet or a GSM connection. There can be for example a laptop or a sensor with a greater power. They monitor the network and make a link between user and network.
B. Routing
To limit the number of communications, because they consume a lot of energy, wireless sensor networks need protocols with effective routes [8] . A solution is to use clustering, which divides networks in many clusters. In each cluster, a cluster-head is elected and this clusterhead collects data from the other nodes of the cluster. It transmits this data to other clusters and inversely. The election of the cluster-head is made by choosing, for example, the node with the most important energy. The objective is to extend the life of the network by reducing the number of data exchanged. Figure 2 shows an example of clustering network, where nodes A, B, C were elected respectively cluster-head of clusters 1, 2 and 3.
C. Fault tolerance
In wireless sensor networks, one or several sensors can be deficient. Sensors are sensitive to an alteration of state, as climatic phenomena (humidity, temperature, electromagnetism) or because their battery are low. The network has to be able to detect this kind of error and correct it. It can modify the routing table to find an another route to send data. Sensors should be able to detect deficient sensors, which send wrong data.
D. Scalability
The number of sensors used for application could be some to thousands. The number could be more in some networks. This scalability is one of a main asset of wireless sensor networks, because they can monitor a large area. Protocols have to be efficient whatever the number of sensors.
E. Limited energy
Most of sensors use a battery. But this battery is actually limited (from some days to some years). Wireless sensor networks are often used to monitor an area. Sensors are deployed to never be recovered or modified. Moreover, it will be difficult in a network with thousands sensors, to find a sensor, which has a deficient battery and to change it. To limit their consumption, sensors have a period of sleep. Communications and calculations use more energy. This is why we have to limit communications and calculations to economize energy.
F. Low power
Despite the current progress in the fabrication of most powerful sensors, sensors have a low power of calculation (for example 16 MHz of frequency and 128Ko of memory for a MicaZ sensor [9] ). This low computing power does not allow us to use complex algorithm for sensor networks, as public key cryptography. Moreover, most of applications using wireless sensor networks needs a large number of sensors. This is why, it is important that these sensors are cheap, but cheap sensors have a lower computing power. The weakness of computing power also increases the latency of the network. If a sensor has to do many calculations, its responsiveness will significantly deteriorate.
G. Medium
The medium used is radio waves. Most of sensors uses the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol to communicate, and more specifically Zigbee protocol [10] based on IEEE 802.15.4 protocol. This protocol provides an energy-efficient communicatio and allows a lerge number of nodes in a network (60,000 nodes).
III. Vulnerability
The specificities of wireless sensor networks (low power, limited energy, etc. . . ) expose them to many threats. If some of these threats could be found in all ad-hoc networks, others are specific to wireless sensor networks. For most of them, they attack the limited energy of sensors.
In such a case, we call a passive attack, an attack that doesn't modify the data. We call an active attack, an attack that modify or delete some data. Following of this section, we make a list of the most current attacks in wireless sensor networks.
A. Eavesdropping
This passive attack consists to listen the network to intercept information on the network. An attacker tries to capture some data in the network by listening the network, if these data is sent with no encryption, he can easily read it. Because this attack doesn't modify the data, it is difficult to detect it by the network.
B. Radio jamming
An attacker sends some radio waves at the same frequency that it is used by wireless sensor networks [11] . The nodes can not communicate if the transport medium is flooded by radio interferences.
C. Message's injection
This active attack is to send many messages on the network. The aim of the attacker is to send false information for corrupting records or simply to saturate the network.
D. Message's replication
In this active attack, the attacker catches sent packets of the network, and sends it again to wrong sensors of the network. By example an attacker can catch a packet where a sensor sends information about a fire detection, and somedays later he will send this packet to wrong the network and make it believe that there is a new fire detection.
E. Node compromise (Destruction or theft)
Theft or the destruction of one or many nodes is one of the simplest physical attack in wireless sensor networks. Sensors are deployed in an area, which can not always be monitored. One physical person can steal one or many nodes, or can destroy them. The network can not work if a node, that link two nodes, is destroyed or stolen. Moreover, if a node is stolen, an attacker can capture some data in this node, like cryptographic data. He can also reprogram the sensor, and replace it in the network. The reprogrammed sensor will spy the network, like explained in [12] , [13] and [14] . A reprogrammed sensor by an attacker is then named a malicious node.
F. Denial of Service
An attacker will use one or many malicious nodes or another device with a powerful signal, to send regularly some messages in the network, to flood it. This is an active attack such as denial of service in traditional network. the attack makes the wireless sensor network out of order and the flood of data forces sensors to be active and consumes their energy [11] .
G. HELLO Flooding
Many discovery protocols in ad-hoc network use the sending of Hello message to discover neighboring nodes and to automatically create a network. With an attack of Hello Flooding, an attacker can use a device with large enough transmission power for compromising every node of the network that this device is its neighbor.
In [15] , we find an example of this attack, showing picture 5, of a malicious node with a powerful connection, which sends HELLO messages to nodes of the network. The neighbouring nodes V believe that the malicious node is a neighbour and will send data to it, but because they are far away, they send packets into oblivion. 
H. Black Hole Attack
The black hole attack consists at first to insert a malicious node in the network [15] . This malicious node, in several ways, will change routing tables, by example by becoming the cluster head of a cluster. The aim is to force a maximum of neighboring nodes to send data to it. After that, all recovered data will never be sent back by the malicious node. The picture 6 shows a malicious node X, which has created a black hole attack. It has changed the routing table of clusters 1, 2, 3 and 4, which send their data to it. In this case, the black hole created by the malicious node X, will never send data, and the communication between the four clusters becomes impossible. 
I. Selective Forwarding (Grey hole attack)
This is a variant of the black hole attack [15] . As in the black hole attack, an attacker will insert a malicious node in the network and this node will change the routing to capture data around it. Unlike the black hole, the attack of selective forwarding relays information. For example, the malicious node will relay all information concerning the routing or non critical data, and it will not relay data, which is critical. This is why, this kind of attack is more difficult to detect than the black hole attack. If the malicious node works normally, it can easily not be detected by the network.
J. Wormhole attack
This attack needs to insert in the network at least two malicious nodes [16] . These nodes are connected by a powerful connection such as a wired liaison or a powerful wireless signal.
This attack wrongs the other nodes of the network on the distance between two bad nodes, and proposes a quicker path. To wrong their neighbors, malicious nodes can replicate data of a far away node to make believe that they are closed to it. Generally the routing protocols search the route with the shortest number of hops. In a wormhole attack, the two malicious provide to achieve a distant position with an unique hop. This possibility wrongs other nodes on the real distances that separate the two malicious nodes. Nodes choose this shortest path for send their data, and they send their data to the malicious nodes. The wormhole attack is showed in the figure 7. Two malicious nodes X1 and X2, connected by a powerful connection, make a wormhole. The nodes A and B choose the shortest path provided by the wormhole for send their data. Data will be captured by the malicious nodes and then by the attacker. 
K. Sinkhole attack
A malicious node attacks directly the data, which circulate near the sink, because the sink or base station is the critical point, which catches the maximum of data on the entire network [15] . To do this attack, the malicious node offers the quickest path to reach the sink, using a powerful connection, as shown in figure 8. Nodes, which are near the malicious node, will send data for the sink to it. All information, which is sent from these nodes to the sink, may be captured by the attacker.
An attacker can make an attack even more powerful.
The attacker can use wormhole attacks associated with a sinkhole attack. The aim is to use these wormholes to cover all the nodes in the network, as shown in figure 9 . The malicious nodes X1, X2, X3 are connected with powerful connections and make wormholes. X3 is connected to the sink with a powerful connection to make a sinkhole attack. This is known as a sphere of influence exerted by the attacker on the network, because it is then able to recover all the information circulating in the wireless sensor network. L. Sybil attack A Sybil attack [17] is a malicious sensor which is masquerading as multiples sensors. It will modify the routing table, which will be wrong. A malicious node, which is masquerading as multiple nodes, can have an important advantage for a cluster head election. With a higher number of votes, it may compromise its neighboring nodes to become a cluster head.
M. Infinite loops
An attacker can use two or more malicious nodes, distant from each other, to send infinitely packets on the network. Because these messages are endlessly sent by the network, like a ping-pong game, sensors consume their energy and the network could saturate.
N. Message alteration
A malicious node catches a message and change it. It adds wrong data (about the receiver, the sender or information itself) or delete some packets. The message become corrupted.
O. Slowdown
An attacker can use some malicious nodes to slowdown the network. It can use a selective forwarding attack to do it. This slowdown may be crucial if the network sends critical information as fire or intrusion detection. This information are slowed so that the attacker can have an advantage. An example can be for an attacker that want to go in a protected area, and want to have the time to enter before the sensors send the detection to the base station.
P. Sleep deprivation torture
This active attack prevents a sensor to sleep in different ways [18] . An attacker sends many messages or asks calculations to a sensor. If the sensor can not sleep, it will consume very quickly its battery to be out of service.
Q. Specific sensor attack
This kind of attack depends on the kind of sensor. An attacker modifies by physical means the response of a sensor. For example, it can light a flame in front of a thermal sensor or light a lamp in front of a brightness sensor. The aim is to deceive sensor, and then send or record false information on the network, or simply to react quite a long time a node or a network, so that they consume their energy in the same way than a sleep deprivation torture.
IV. Security Mechanisms
To counter these attacks, that threaten wireless sensor networks, several researches are trying to find appropriate solutions. These solutions have to take into account the specificities of wireless sensor networks. We have to therefore find simple solutions that allow securing the network while consuming as little energy as possible and that these solutions are adapted to a low computing power.
Among these solutions, there are mechanisms such as the data partitioning, using key management, intruder detection by location or trust management. In this section we discuss about a unexhaustive list of solutions, what they prodive and their limits. [19] and [20] give a solution to prevent the capture of information in wireless sensor networks by the data partitioning. The aim is to divide the information into several parts.
A. Data Partitioning
If a sensor tries to send information, it cuts the data into several packets of fixed size. Each packet are sent on a different route. Packets pass in different nodes. Packets are eventually received by the sink, which could then bring them together to reproduce information. An attacker have to catch all packets of a message if it want to know the information. In order to do it, it has to be able to listen the entire network. It is more complicated for an attacker to have the information, but this solution increases the energy's consumption (with a risk of overloading treatment), because it needs to use a number of nodes more important to communicate.
An example of this solution is represented by the figure 10, where a sensor A divides a message into 3 packets which are going to follow 3 different paths.
B. Cryptography
As we have explained before, it is not relevant in wireless sensor networks to use complex encryption methods as public key cryptography. The low computing power of [21] .
The results of the table 1 show how RSA can not be used with a sensor. The results of ECC are better, and let us hope that we can use it in some wireless sensor networks where their a short latency has not a big impact. TinyECC [22] provides then a library for using ECC in TinyOS 1.0 [23] .
However most of cryptography solutions in wireless sensor networks uses symetric key cryptographys for securing the network, which are more adapted and quicker to perform. The best example is TinySEC [24] a link layer security for TinyOS that uses the AES algorithm to encrypt data. If cryptography allows us to secure the confidentiality of data, we have to find a solution for the problem of the key distribution, which are described in [25] , and we need to find an appropriate key management for the network.
C. Key management
For solutions of key management, we find generally four types which can be used [26] :
• Global key: one key is shared by the entire network.
To send a message, information is encrypted with this key. Once the message is received, it can be decrypted with the same key. This solution is an energy-efficient solution of cryptography . The information is encrypted once by the sender and decrypted only once by the receiver. However, it's the solution with a limited security. If an attacker could find the key, he is able to hear the entire network which communicates with this unique key. To know this key also allows the possibility to insert a malicious node in the network.
• Pair wise key node: Each node has a different key to communicate with a neighboring node which shares this key. So if one node has "n" neighbours, it has "n" key stored to communicate with its neighbours. In this solution, a node that sends a message have to encrypt the message with key neighbour who receives the information. The neighboring decrypts information to re-encrypt with the key corresponding to the following receiver. This solution increases considerably the security of the network, because if an attacker discovers a key, this key is just able to communicate with two nodes, and limits the power of this attack. The attacker have to find all pair wise key to listen the entire network. However, this technique is not energy-efficient especially in time of calculation, since each pair of nodes which transmits information have to encrypt and decrypt a message. The lifetime of the network and its rate is going to be reduced.
• Pair wise key group: Each group or cluster has a key to communicate between nodes in the cluster. Cluster-heads use a single key for all cluster-heads to communicate or use a pair wise key to communicate between two cluster-heads. This solution is an hybrid solution to the first two techniques of encryption and offers a compromise between security and energy efficiency. It may limit the number of encryption in communications. However it increases the work of clusters heads, which have to decrypt and encrypt the information. To be effective, we have to ensure that cluster-heads change regularly in order not to consume all the energy of the cluster head.
• Individual key: In this solution, each node has its own key to encrypt data. This key is only known by the sink. As a consequence, a message sent by this node goes around hidden on the network until it reaches the sink. This solution is one of the better way to limit the consumption of the network. Nevertheless, this solution secures only communication between a node and the sink.
D. Steganography
When cryptography consists to make unreadable a data, steganography is to hide the existance of data. Most of exemple of steganography can be found with data hide in a text, a picture or a video. Then these techniques can not be applied with wireless sensor networks because data are not enough big. However [27] and [28] show that it is possible to hide the data in the PHY layer of the 802.15.4 protocol by using the noise of the signal for creating a steganographic channel. This solution provides to hide the data, however if an attacker know the method, the data is no more protected.
E. Generation
One solution proposed by [29] is to use a key generation. Each period or generation, the sink sends a new key to the whole network. This key is used as a certificate for each node, to prove it belongs to the network. If an unidentified node tries to come into the wireless sensor network and if it does not have this key generation, the network will refuse its integration.
Another benefit of this technique is that it limits substitution attacks of a sensor and the reprogramming of the sensor to be reused in the network.
Fig. 9. Detection of a malicious node with key generation
An example is given in figure 11 , where four sensors A, B, C, D are part of a sensor network which communicate with a symmetric pair wise key node. In Phase I, sensors have a key generation 5. In Phase II, the A node is removed by an attacker, and during its absence on the network, the sink forward a new generation key 7. In Phase III, the sensor A which has been reprogrammed and reinserted into the network makes an insertion request into the network to sensor B and sensor C. In Phase IV nodes B and C reject the request of A, because comparing their key generation, they found that they are different.
This technique is energy-efficient and easy to deploy. However it directed only closed networks, which can not accept new nodes. Moreover, there is the problem of a node, which can not receive a key to progress time.
F. Localization
A mechanism used to detect malicious nodes and especially wormhole attacks, is to use a technique for locating geographically a node, as proposed by [30] and [31] . For this solution, the wireless sensor network needs specific sensors called beacon node, which are sensors that knowing their geographical position. For example they can use for a GPS equipment.
With the localization, if a sensor requests to join the network, beacons will receive this request and be able to estimate its location with their hearing area. Beacons will make a grid of their respective hearing area, and each beacon node, which received the request for entry in the network, will vote for an area of the grid that is able to hear. The area which receives the greatest number of votes will be supposed to be the area where is the new sensor. Figure 12 shows an example of election between 4 beacon sensors A, B, C and D. They make a grid of their area listening. They vote for each zone of the grid. They can estimate the position of the sensor which they are able to estimate. The new sensor should be found in the area with the most votes, in this example the area with 3 votes.
Fig. 10. Localization with beacons
In case of a wormhole attack with two malicious nodes, they will be geo-located by beacon nodes, which are going to be to able to determine the distance between the two nodes. They can see if this distance is higher than the normal distance for a communication in one hop, and then detect the attack. The problem of this solution is that it needs beacon sensors equipped with GPS device or precalibrated on the ground.
G. Trust management
One solution proposed by [32] , [33] , [34] , [35] , [36] and [37] is to use the mechanisms of trust and reputation that can be found in peer to peer networks [38] , community networks or even market websites as Ebay .
In this kind of network as in wireless sensor networks, it is hard, because of the large number of nodes, to know which node can be a malicious node. To detect and protect the integrity of the network, each node of the network monitors its neighboring nodes and their actions over time. Depending on actions taken by its neighboring nodes, a node will increase a level of trust of these nodes, based on its reputation. When a node does not carry out a request, its level of trust falls. If this node always sends correctly data, its level of trust increases.
With the help of these levels of trust, a node will then choose the most secure route for sending data. Instead of going through the fastest path (number of hops or geographical distance), the node will choose to send its data via nodes with the highest level of trust (the safest path).
This mechanism is represented figure 13 , where a node A has to send data to a node D. Instead of going through the shortest route which passes through X, which is a node with a level of trust of 3 (level is between 0 and 10, 10 is the highest level of trust) and potentially a malicious node, the node A will send information via nodes B and C, which have a level of trust of 8 and 9 and which propose the safest route. With this solution, it also uses a technique called watchdog [39] . In the mechanism of watchdog, each communication between two nodes A and B is heard by an intermediate node C, located in the area of communication. The node can oversee if this communication has been carried out, as shown in Figure  14 . These techniques make it possible to eliminate nodes that are potentially dangerous, and protect data to go through these nodes. Solutions based on the trust management are energy-efficient, and can not use cryptography in a network, which doesn't need a high security. But for networks that require maximum security, they are not always adapted. Thus a malicious node that just record data on the network, as in a grey hole ttacka, is hardly detectable.
V. Conclusion
Recent technological advances in wireless sensor networks have allowed widespread use of this kind of network. But information is still vulnerable to many attacks, which are often specific to ad-hoc networks, or even exclusive to wireless sensor networks.
Some solutions are proposed by the scientific community to counter these attacks, but as we showed in this article, they give not a response to all attacks. The low computing power of sensors and especially their limited energy are obstacles to the deployment of advanced techniques, and we are still searching for solutions, which can accomodate security, would meld life-time and a good latency of sensors. We have to remember that they are not an only secure solution in wireless sensor networks. The level of security and the vulnerability of a wireless sensors network depend on the application that we have to deploy.
